Have you thought about India’s friends and foes lately? I’m sure you have at some point. The answer used to be straightforward. China and Pakistan to the north and west meant we risked a two-front war at worst. At best, we dealt with recurring geographic, economic, and political hostility amidst peacetime. Some peace of mind was derived from the fact that US and Indian interests often converged on balancing China. The nuclear deal signalled that convergence. Washington’s support has felt solid.
A lot of that has changed in recent times. The bipartisan consensus in Washington that favoured India is now less predictable and more contested under Trump. We’re facing US economic pressure that, in some sectors, is as consequential as anything China throws at us. Right now, India faces among the steepest US tariffs, steeper than China’s.
Meanwhile, the Indo-Pacific remains as fragile and volatile as ever. Several neighbours face acute instability. Political crises, conflict, or debt stress often afflict them simultaneously. These circumstances limit opportunities for long-term economic engagement. Meanwhile, the war and sanctions have severely constrained Russia, inflicting long-term damage to investment and access to technology. Sanctions have forced Russia to redirect trade and procurement toward a smaller set of partners, especially China.
Amidst all this, the Free Trade Agreement with the EU is announced—at a crucial time when India seeks new economic and technological options. To assess its value amid geopolitical volatility, we must determine whether the FTA’s foundation supports a strategic superstructure that secures India’s interests.
The FTA sets a framework for predictable regulatory cooperation. This groundwork enables credible partnerships in critical sectors without duplicating efforts. Here are some examples.
Many countries want to accelerate their space programs to match the launch cadence of the US and China. India and France could anchor a consortium with Brazil and Indonesia. India provides low-cost launches. Brazil offers equatorial launch sites that can reduce costs. France supplies advanced satellite payloads. Indonesia has an acute communication and maritime surveillance requirement across 17,000 islands. The EU deal matters here because it pushes India and France toward clearer, more predictable rules around trade and IP—reducing friction for joint projects. In an aggressive but realistic timeline, this group could launch a jointly owned earth-observation constellation within three years and a communication megaconstellation in five. Operational capability, shared sovereignty, strategic independence.
When it comes to AI and compute, India and several European countries share the same strategic vulnerability in terms of access, along with the UAE and Japan. France brings open-weight AI models, the UAE offers deployment capital, Japan provides semiconductor packaging expertise, and India contributes engineering depth and market demand. The FTA aims to de-risk collaboration by clarifying IP, services, and digital-trade disciplines over time, enabling capability-building now as the broader agreement phases in. These four nations could establish shared compute infrastructure within 18 months and jointly develop open alternatives to Compute Unified Device Architecture and Electronic Design Automation tools.
Gathering ideas from a collective brainstorming exercise at the Takshashila Institution, I’ve written a paper about this with my co-authors. We have argued that sectoral plurilateral blocs, like the examples above, provide shared resources, collaboration, and resilience, making them our best bet for overcoming geopolitical coercion.
Our paper outlines 12 such sectoral blocs spanning semiconductors, fintech, counterterrorism, cyber-fraud, disaster relief, migration, pharma and more. By participating in these blocs, India reduces single-point dependencies, creates alternatives, and gains more flexibility to navigate a world where old certainties have weakened. Each bloc delivers specific benefits, such as secure access to technology, improved crisis response, or greater economic autonomy.
Link to the paper: https://takshashila.org.in/content/publications/20260125-Sectoral-Plurilateral-Blocs.html
Just hope that plurilaterals don't come out with cringe acronyms